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Prices in government and employer-sponsored health insurance markets only partially reflect insurers'
expected costs of coverage for different enrollees. This can create inefficient distortions when consumers
self-select into plans. We develop a simple model to study this problem and estimate it using new
data on small employers. In the markets we observe, the welfare loss compared to the feasible efficient
benchmark is around 2-11% of coverage costs. Three-quarters of this is due to restrictions on risk-rating
employee contributions; the rest is due to inefficient contribution choices. Despite the inefficiency,
we find substantial benefits from plan choice relative to single-insurer options.
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Whether competition in health insurance markets leads to eﬃcient outcomes is a central question for
health policy. Markets are eﬀective when prices direct consumers and ﬁrms to behave eﬃciently. But
in health insurance markets, prices often do not reﬂect the diﬀerent costs of coverage for diﬀerent
enrollees in diﬀerent health plans. This lack of information in prices generates two concerns. If
insurers receive premiums that do not reﬂect enrollee risk, they have an incentive to engage in
risk selection through plan design (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976; Newhouse, 1996). Similarly, if
consumers face prices that do not reﬂect cost diﬀerences across plans, they may select coverage
ineﬃciently (Akerlof, 1970; Feldman and Dowd, 1982). While it is widely recognized that these
problems may impair the eﬃciency of competitive health insurance markets, evidence on their
quantitative importance for social welfare is limited.
A complicating factor in health insurance markets is the role played by intermediaries. In the
U.S. private market, employers generally contract with insurers to create a menu of plans from which
employees select coverage. The government or a quasi-public organization plays a similar role in
the U.S. Medicare program and the national systems of Germany and the Netherlands. To address
incentive problems in plan design, these intermediaries have begun to “risk-adjust” payments to
plans (Ellis and van de Ven, 2000; Keenan et al., 2001). Consumers, however, typically face prices
that do not vary by individual risk. Indeed federal law prohibits U.S. employers from charging
employees or their dependents diﬀerent amounts based on health-related factors (GAO 2003). And
public programs frequently require community rating of enrollee contributions. Moreover, even
given the institutional restrictions on pricing, contributions set by employers and in regulated
markets may not be optimal in terms of maximizing social welfare given the complexities of self-
selection in insurance markets.
In this paper, we analyze the eﬀect of plan pricing on allocative eﬃciency. We begin by making a
basic theoretical point regarding the type of prices necessary to achieve eﬃcient matching. Existing
work suggests that while poorly chosen contribution policies may lead to ineﬃcient outcomes, the
problem can be solved by choosing an optimal uniform contribution, set to equal the incremental
cost of the marginal consumer (e.g. Feldman and Dowd, 1982; Cutler and Reber, 1998; Pauly and
Herring, 2000; Cutler and Zeckhauser, 2000). We demonstrate that if either (a) diﬀerences in plan
cost vary with enrollee risk more than consumer preferences, or (b) consumer choice is not purely
1a function of health risk, achieving eﬃciency is not so simple. Speciﬁcally, no uniform contribution
policy will lead to eﬃcient consumer choices.
While this theoretical observation in principle applies broadly, its practical relevance is a em-
pirical question. To assess this, we develop an econometric model of health plan demand and
costs. We follow a recent trend by borrowing and extending standard empirical tools used to study
product markets to analyze market eﬃciency in a setting with selection eﬀects. We estimate the
model using a novel dataset of small employers. Our estimates indicate that, at least in the setting
we consider, conditions (a) and (b) both apply: cost diﬀerences among plans vary markedly with
enrollee health status, and both household preferences and health status are important for plan
choice. Using the model, we go on to estimate the dollar welfare costs associated with alternative
pricing policies.
We estimate that, in our setting, observed employer contribution policies cause social welfare
to fall short of what could be achieved with plan contributions that vary by measurable risk. The
shortfall is between $60 and $325 annually per enrollee, or 2-11% of coverage costs. Employers in our
data could realize approximately 1/4 of this surplus within current nondiscrimination requirements
by adjusting their employee contributions to encourage more eﬃcient choices, but capturing the
remainder would require setting diﬀerent prices for people in the same ﬁrm. We also ﬁnd that
employees select plans based on information that is relevant for coverage cost but is not captured
by the risk-adjustment system used in our setting. A hypothetical social planner who incorporated
this private information into prices could increase welfare by an additional $100 annually per
enrollee. Despite the social ineﬃciencies implied by our estimates, we also ﬁnd that the observed
plan oﬀerings and resulting self-selection have generated substantial beneﬁts over any single-plan
oﬀering.
Understanding the types of coverage in our data is important for interpreting the results. The
ﬁrms we observe all oﬀer plans from two insurers. One contracts with a fairly broad network of care
providers, relying primarily on patient cost sharing and, for some enrollees, primary care gatekeepers
to control utilization. The other has an exclusive provider network and a tightly integrated delivery
system and requires very little patient cost sharing. Using data on the plans’ premium bids and
realized costs to their estimate costs, we ﬁnd that the two insurers have very diﬀerent cost structures.
Insurer costs are similar for an individual of average health status, but higher for healthy enrollees
and signiﬁcantly lower for less healthy enrollees in the integrated delivery system.
2While our estimates of prices elasticity are broadly in line with those from other studies of
health plan choice, our ﬁndings with respect to risk selection are somewhat diﬀerent. Much of
the older literature has found that particular plans experience highly unfavorable selection. In our
setting, we ﬁnd that plans experience unfavorable selection along diﬀering components of risk (age,
gender, measured health status), but no one plan experiences very unfavorable selection overall.
One explanation for this more nuanced choice behavior may be the nature of the plans. Put
simply, rather than oﬀering “more” and “less” coverage, the plans are diﬀerentiated along several
dimensions. The insurer with the broader network oﬀers more ﬂexibility, but requires more cost-
sharing than the integrated insurer. The integrated insurer, in contrast, relies more heavily on
supply side mechanisms to control utilization. This product diﬀerentiation seems particularly salient
given the dramatic shift over the last two decades in the types of products available in the industry
as a whole. In 1987, 73% of people with employer-sponsored health insurance had conventional
coverage in which plans diﬀered primarily in the extent of patient cost sharing. By 2007, only
3% had this type of conventional coverage, and the vast majority of consumers were enrolled in
either health maintenance organizations or preferred provider organizations (KFF, 2007). Limits
on provider networks have become commonplace and many, if not most, plans employ a mix of
supply-side and demand-side utilization management. This evolution suggests that classic insights
based on purely risk-based sorting may not adequately capture the dynamics of today’s market.1
In our setting, two features of the market lead to distortions under uniform plan pricing: hetero-
geneity in household plan preferences and the integrated delivery system’s signiﬁcant cost advantage
for individuals in worse health. Our estimates suggest that although on average high risk households
have some preference for ﬂexibility, a large fraction would choose the integrated delivery system
if they had to internalize the relevant cost diﬀerential between the plans. Achieving this with a
uniform contribution policy, however, would require that all households face a steep premium for
the more ﬂexible insurer. This in turn would result in a welfare loss for those lower risk households
who value greater plan ﬂexibility. While the exact magnitude of the welfare loss depends on the
extent of the cost diﬀerential and the degree of heterogeneity in taste among consumers, the basic
argument may extend to other markets.
Our analysis ties in to a large literature studying health plan choice, and a smaller, more recent
1Cutler, Finkelstein and McGarry (2008) stress that a broad view of heterogeneity in preferences is important for
understanding many aspects of insurance markets.
3literature quantifying the eﬃciency of health insurance markets. Work on health plan choice,
particularly the role of risk selection, is well summarized by Glied (2000) and Cutler and Zeckhauser
(2000). We extend this literature in two ways. First, we demonstrate that risk selection across
plans takes place on both characteristics of consumers that are observable using existing methods
to measure risk and those that are not observable ex-ante either to insurers or intermediaries.2 This
implies that current methods of risk adjusting payments across plans may be inadequate to fully
counteract the incentives of plans to select enrollees through plan design. Second, as noted above,
we document somewhat more nuanced risk selection, which we suggest may relate to the greater
horizontal product diﬀerentiation in today’s market for health insurance.3
More directly related is a smaller literature quantifying the eﬃciency of health insurance mar-
kets, starting with Cutler and Reber (1998), and including more recent papers by Carlin and Town
(2007) and Einav, Finkelstein and Cullen (2008). We discuss these papers in more detail below,
but one key diﬀerence is the benchmark we use to deﬁne eﬃciency. These papers implicitly deﬁne
eﬃciency to be best allocation that can be observed with uniform pricing. One point we make is
that this is a rather constrained notion of eﬃciency, as uniform pricing may preclude a large fraction
of the welfare gains that could in principle be achieved with available information, and also ignores
the welfare loss that is inevitably created by private information about health status.4 At a broader
level, however, we view these papers as highly complementary. They analyze quite diﬀerent settings
so comparing results reveals some interesting cross-market diﬀerences in plan diﬀerentiation and
consumer behavior.
Our analysis may also shed light on two puzzles in the health insurance literature. One is
why employers have not systematically adopted “Enthoven-style” contribution policies that expose
employees to the full premium increment of choosing higher cost plans in order to promote more
eﬃcient plan choices (Enthoven and Kronick 1989). In our data, only a small fraction of the ﬁrms
use such a policy. Nevertheless, our results suggest that the eﬃciency gains from such a change
2Our approach here follows Cardon and Hendel (2001), who found no evidence that private information about
health status was relevant for choice behavior.
3With respect to the choices made by group purchasers, our paper also relates to Goldstein and Pauly’s (1976)
theoretical work on group health insurance as a local public good. They focused on the incentives facing an employer
choosing a single plan for a group of workers with heterogeneous preferences for coverage. Our analysis looks at
optimal contribution setting with multiple plans and alternative pricing constraints.
4Cutler and Reber’s (1998) paper is a bit of an exception here because, lacking any cost data, they simply assume
a ﬁxed dollar diﬀerence in plan costs, irrespective of health status. If this were in fact the case, uniform pricing would
suﬃce to achieve a ﬁrst-best outcome, even with private health status information, which they do not consider.
4would be relatively modest both because demand is relatively price inelastic and because, with a
uniform contribution, any eﬃciency gains from moving higher risk enrollees to the integrated plan
are oﬀset by the eﬃciency losses experienced by lower risk enrollees who highly value the greater
ﬂexibility of the network plan. The second puzzle is why the integrated model of health care
delivery has not been more successful. We ﬁnd that the integrated insurer achieves the greatest
savings for people in poor health, but that current pricing institutions make it diﬃcult to target
these households although it might lead to overall eﬃciency gains.
We emphasize that our analysis has some important limitations. First, it is based on a particular,
and only moderately-sized, sample of workers and ﬁrms. To address this, we perform a variety of
sensitivity analyses on our key parameter estimates, which we discuss in the last section. Second,
we take plan oﬀerings as given. This seems reasonable given that we are looking at small to medium
size employers, but a broader analysis of pricing ideally would incorporate plan design. Third, we do
not address issues of utilization behavior, or try to assess the relative social eﬃciency of health care
utilization under the diﬀerent plans in our data. Finally, our analysis is based on a static model. In
practice, one problem with risk-rated contributions is that they can create dynamic reclassiﬁcation
risk for individuals. We discuss this issue in the conclusion.
2 H e a l t hP l a nP r i c i n ga n dM a r k e tE ﬃciency
We illustrate the relationship between pricing and the eﬃciency of plan selection by adapting
the model of Feldman and Dowd (1982). In their model, consumers are distinguished by their
forecastable health risk, denoted θ. Each consumer chooses between a high-cost plan (plan A) and
a low cost plan (plan B). While plans can be diﬀerentiated along many dimensions, it is probably
easiest to think of them, for the moment, as vertically diﬀerentiated. The plans’ expected costs
of covering a type-θ consumer are cA(θ) and cB(θ).L e t ∆c(θ)=cA(θ) − cB(θ) denote the cost
diﬀerential. We assume that ∆c is strictly positive and increasing in θ.
Let vA(θ) and vB(θ) denote a type θ’s expected (dollar) value from being covered by each of the
plans. For the moment, we assume that the beneﬁts of coverage are determined only by forecastable
health risk. We assume that contributions vary across plans, but not across consumers. A consumer
w h om a k e sac o n t r i b u t i o npj to enroll in plan j ∈ {A,B} gets a net beneﬁt vj(θ)−pj.W em a k et h e
simplifying assumption, which we maintain in our econometric model, that while consumers may be
5highly risk-averse to uncertainty about their health status, care and future medical expenditures,
they do not exhibit diminishing marginal utility over the range of potential premiums.5 Deﬁne
∆v(θ)=vA(θ)−vB(θ) to be the additional amount a type-θ consumer would pay for the high-cost
plan.
The eﬃcient assignment places a type-θ consumer in plan A i fa n do n l yi f
∆v(θ) − ∆c(θ) ≥ 0.
At the same time, a type-θ consumer will select plan A if and only if
∆v(θ) − ∆p ≥ 0,
where ∆p = pA − pB is the incremental contribution for plan A.
Are there prices that lead to an eﬃcient outcome? Assume that ∆v(θ) is increasing in θ,w h i c h
seems appropriate if plan A simply oﬀers more generous coverage or easier access to care than plan
B. Then for any incremental contribution ∆p, there is a threshold type θ(∆p) such that a consumer
of type θ chooses plan A if and only if θ ≥ θ(∆p).6 This threshold can be varied arbitrarily with
∆p. Therefore it will be possible to achieve eﬃcient sorting if and only if the eﬃcient assignment
also involves a threshold rule, i.e. if the surplus function ∆v(θ) − ∆c(θ) is negative up to some θ∗
and positive above it. Intuitively, the requirement for eﬃciency is that willingness to pay increases
m o r eq u i c k l yw i t hr i s kt h a nd o e st h ec o s td i ﬀerential between plans.
Existing analyses assume either explicitly or implicitly that the surplus function has the req-
uisite single crossing property (e.g. Feldman and Dowd, 1982; Cutler and Reber 1998; Cutler and
Zeckhauser 2000; Miller 2005). In this case, depicted in Figure 1(a), the eﬃcient assignment can be
decentralized by setting ∆p = ∆c(θ∗). The problem emphasized in the literature is that purchasers
may not choose the correct premium diﬀerential. If ∆p is too high, plan A attracts only the very
highest risks. If prices are set by looking at past outcomes, one can even end up with an adverse
selection “death spiral,” where a higher incremental premium for plan A leads to severe adverse
5Though traditional models often derive risk-aversion from a globally concave utility function deﬁned over wealth,
there are many reasons to distinguish aversion to large risks, such as health status and health expenditures from
diminishing marginal utility over the range of small expenditures, even apart from the modeling simplicity it aﬀords.
6An empirical prediction of this model is that plan A will experience unfavorable selection, and its risk composition
will be worse the larger is ∆p.
6selection, which in turns leads to an even greater contribution gap (Cutler and Reber, 1998). Alter-
natively, if ∆p<∆c(θ∗), too many people will select plan A, including some for whom the beneﬁts
do not exceed the incremental social costs.
There are at least two reasons to expand on this familiar analysis. First, even in the model we
have been considering–where consumers are diﬀerentiated only by health status and plans are more
or less vertically diﬀerentiated–it may be socially eﬃcient for high risks to enroll in a cost-conscious
plan. Arguably the beneﬁts of delivering care eﬃciently are largest for the chronically ill.7 The
cost savings from a plan that more actively manages utilization might more than compensate these
consumers for the loss of ﬂexibility. In this case, depicted in Figure 1(b), the eﬃcient assignment
cannot be achieved because high risk consumers always enroll in plan A even though it is eﬃcient
for them to enroll in plan B.
Perhaps a more general issue, however, is that the diﬀerences between health plans often extend
beyond “more” versus “less” coverage, and the diﬀerences between consumers often extend beyond
“more” versus “less” health risk. For instance, ﬁrms increasingly oﬀer employees both an HMO
and a PPO option. An HMO may place greater restriction on provider choice and attempt to
control care using supply-side mechanisms, while requiring relatively little cost sharing. A PPO
typically provides access to a broader set of providers and asserts less direct control over care, but
requires greater cost sharing. Consumers with health problems may place greater value on provider
ﬂexibility, but may also be wary of increased cost-sharing. As a result, heterogeneity in tastes or
income may be at least as important as health status in driving choice.
To capture this, think of plan A explicitly as a PPO and plan B as an HMO. We allow consumers
to vary in at least two dimensions: forecastable risk and taste. Speciﬁcally, let ε denote a consumer’s
preference for provider choice, so that ∆v(θ,ε) is the consumer’s extra willingness to pay for plan
A. To make the extension non-trivial, suppose that tastes matter: ∆v(θ,ε) is increasing in ε.A
consumer of type (θ,ε) is eﬃciently assigned to plan A i fa n do n l yi f∆v(θ,ε) − ∆c(θ) > 0 and
chooses plan A if and only if ∆v(θ,ε)−∆p. Clearly, uniform pricing does not generate the eﬃcient
allocation: assuming consumers cannot be priced on the basis of their tastes, achieving eﬃcient
sorting requires risk-based pricing so that consumers of type θ face a contribution diﬀerential ∆c(θ).8
7The most detailed analysis of diﬀerences in utilization between traditional Medicare coverage and Medicare
managed care plans found that the reductions in utilization generated by managed care plans were concentrated
among high risk beneﬁciaries and that these reductions in utilization were not associated with diﬀerences in short
term health outcomes (Brown 1993).
8One way to see this in relation to the classic analysis is that for any uniform diﬀerential ∆p,t h e r ea r emany
7The potential matching ineﬃciencies under uniform pricing are depicted in Figures 2(a) and
2(b). In both, we assume ∆v is strictly increasing in θ as well as ε, although as we have argued, that
n e e dn o tb es o .T h ec u r v e∆v(θ,ε)=∆p represents the set of consumers who are just indiﬀerent
between plans for a given contribution diﬀerential. Consumers above and to the right choose the
PPO; those below and to the left choose the HMO. Similarly, ∆v(θ,ε)=∆c(θ) deﬁnes the set of
consumers who are marginal in the eﬃcient allocation. Figure 2(a) shows a situation where, holding
tastes constant, the proportion of consumers for whom the PPO is eﬃcient increases with risk. In
this case, the PPO is eﬃcient for consumers above and to the right of ∆v(θ,ε)=∆c(θ),a n dt h e
HMO is eﬃcient for consumers below and to the left. Figure 2(b) shows the reverse situation, where
the eﬃcient proportion of consumers in the PPO declines with risk. In this case, the PPO is eﬃcient
for consumers above and to the left of ∆v(θ,ε)=∆c(θ) In both cases, there is a critical type θ0
such that ∆c(θ0)=∆p. For this risk type, consumers eﬃciently allocate across plans because the
contribution is equal to the cost diﬀerential between plans. All consumers with risk types above θ0
are eﬀectively subsidized to choose the PPO and some do so ineﬃciently. All consumers with risk
types below θ0 face a price diﬀerential above what is actuarially fair, and some ineﬃciently opt for
the HMO.
These ﬁgures suggest some straightforward observations. First, the relationship between eﬃcient
and equilibrium matching depends crucially on how the cost diﬀerential ∆c(θ) varies with consumer
risk. If ∆c(θ) does not vary much, one can approximate the eﬃcient risk-adjusted contribution with
a uniform contribution. In Figures 2(a) and 2(b), reducing the extent to which the cost diﬀerential
varies by risk will cause the curve deﬁning the eﬃcient allocation to rotate toward the curve deﬁning
the market allocation, reducing the proportions of consumers who choose the HMO and the PPO
ineﬃciently. Second, the responsiveness of consumers to price as well as to risk when choosing
among plans will determine the slope of each curve. If consumer demand is relatively price and
risk elastic, the welfare gain from risk-rating contributions may be substantial. On the other
hand, if consumer demand is highly inelastic, with consumers sorting primarily on the basis of
taste, changing to the eﬃcient risk-rated contribution policy may not have a large eﬀect. Finally,
the distribution of consumers based on their risk and their tastes will determine the degree of
ineﬃciency. For example, in Figure 2(a), the welfare loss associated with uniform contributions
will be greater if consumers are concentrated in the areas in which they choose plans ineﬃciently
marginal consumers, each with a diﬀe r e n tc o s td i ﬀerential ∆c.
8rather than if they are spread out across risk/preference space.
Because each of these issues is inherently quantitative in nature, an empirical analysis is needed
to assess market eﬃciency and social welfare. In what follows, we develop an econometric version of
the model and estimate its parameters. This allows us to evaluate empirically the degree to which
various pricing arrangements aﬀect social welfare.
3 Data and Environment
3.1 Institutional Setting
Our analysis is based on data from a private ﬁrm that sells a dual-carrier, choice-based health
insurance product to small and mid-sized employers. The ﬁrm obtains agreements from insurers to
oﬀer their plans as a single product, markets the product to employers, and administers the beneﬁt
for those who purchase it. We refer to this ﬁrm as the intermediary.
We examine data from 11 employers who purchased coverage from the intermediary in a single
metropolitan area in the western United States during 2004 and 2005. In this market, the inter-
mediary oﬀers products from two insurers. One insurer contracts non-exclusively with a relatively
broad set of providers in the local market, oﬀering two plans, which we refer to as the network HMO
and the network PPO.9 The network HMO requires enrollees to choose a primary care physician
and to obtain a referral to visit a specialist, and does not cover care from out-of-network providers.
The network PPO does not require referrals for specialist visits and covers care from providers
outside the plan’s network, although with increased cost-sharing. The second insurer features an
exclusive provider network and a highly integrated delivery system that facilitates greater supply
side utilization management. It also oﬀers two plans: its standard HMO (integrated HMO)a n d
ap o i n t - o f - s e r v i c eo p t i o n( integrated POS) that allows enrollees to seek care outside the plan’s
network at a higher cost.
The intermediary generally follows a standard process when dealing with employers. The em-
ployer ﬁrst chooses which plans to oﬀer to its employees. Employers may customize the basic plans
described above to a limited degree by varying characteristics such as the deductible and the level of
9This insurer also oﬀers a point-of-service (POS) plan that is the HMO with the option to go out-of-network at
higher cost. Unfortunately we are not able to distinguish between network POS and HMO enrollees. As a result, we
simplify our analysis by dropping the three employer-years where the network POS was oﬀered. Our results are not
sensitive to alternative approaches to handling this issue.
9coinsurance, but most dimensions of the coverage are ﬁxed. Employers typically oﬀer four coverage
tiers: employee only, employee plus spouse, employee plus children, and employee plus family.10
The level of cost sharing varies across coverage tiers.
The insurers then provide quotes, which we refer to as bids, for each plan on the employer’s
menu. The intermediary provides information on the composition of the group to help insurers
form their bids. In an employer’s ﬁrst year with the intermediary, this information is limited to
the distribution of employees by age and sex. In subsequent years, the insurers receive additional
information on the health status of the workers,i nt h ef o r mo far i s ks c o r ed e s c r i b e db e l o w .T h e
intermediary instructs the insurers to bid as if they were covering all workers within each ﬁrm.
While the insurers provide bids for each tier, the bids for tiers other than employee-only are simply
scaled from the employee-only bids by a constant that is very similar across employers and plans.
Given the bids, the employer sets the employee contribution by coverage tier for each plan on the
menu. While neither the intermediary nor the insurers place any restrictions on how employers set
their contributions, the intermediary encourages them to use a “managed competition” approach
in which employees face the full marginal cost for more expensive plans. Employees make their
choices after observing the menu of plans and the required contributions. If an employee selects a
plan, the plan must allow the employee to enroll.
The last step is a series of payments. For each employee enrolled in a particular product, the
employer pays the intermediary the insurer’s bid. The intermediary passes on these payments to
the insurers, implementing a system of transfers between insurers to compensate for diﬀerential
selection across plans based on the health status of enrolled employees and their dependents.
The intermediary uses a standard methodology for measuring enrollee health status, the Rx-
Group model developed by DxCG, Inc. The model produces risk scores conditional on a person’s
age, sex, and health status. Health status is determined by using prescription drug utilization to
identify chronic conditions.11 In our setting, the insurers report prescription drug utilization from
the current year to the intermediary. The intermediary uses the DxCG algorithm to predict ex-
10Two ﬁrms deﬁne coverage tiers based on employee only, employee plus one dependent, and employee plus two or
more dependents.
11DxCG uses an internally-developed mapping of prescription drugs to their therapeutic indication to identify
chronic conditions. The health expenditure model is estimated on a very large sample (1,000,000+) of people under
65 with private health insurance. Using the estimated model, the software predicts covered health expenditures for
a given individual. A score of 1 corresponds to a mean prediction from the original estimation sample. See Zhao et
al. (2005) for more detail.
10penditures for each enrollee and makes corresponding transfers across the insurers. In our analysis,
we use the term “risk score” to refer to the DxCG prediction, conditional on age, sex and health
status, of an individual’s health expenditures relative to the mean of the much larger base sample
on which DxCG calibrates their model. We note that our use of the term risk refers only to the
level and not to the variance of the expected expenditure, although we might naturally expect a
relationship between the two.
Each insurer also provides the intermediary with information on their realized costs for each
employer group. The network insurer reports average claims per member per month for enrollees
covered by either of the insurer’s products. The integrated insurer reports similar information
developed from an internal cost accounting system. Neither insurer distinguishes between its plans
when reporting this information.
3.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our data includes all of the information discussed above: the plan oﬀerings and contribution policies
of each employer, the risk scores and plan choices of employees and their dependents, and the bids
and reported costs of each insurer. A primary strength of the data is that it includes both demand-
side information on employees and their choice behavior and supply-side information on insurer
costs and bids in a setting with two very diﬀerent types of insurers. In addition, many of the
employers we observe oﬀer nearly identical plans but have diﬀerent risk proﬁles and contribution
policies which provides useful variation to identify demand and costs.
Another useful feature of the data is that we observe each employer during their ﬁrst year of
participation in the program. Insurers have little information on ﬁrm characteristics beyond that
provided by the intermediary during the ﬁrst year, allowing us to observe how plans bid when they
have similar information on the likely risk of a group.12 On the demand side, a large literature
documents that health plan choices are highly persistent (e.g. Neipp and Zeckhauser, 1985), so
observing choice behavior in the ﬁrst year likely provides a good indication of steady-state demand
and allows us to observe the plan characteristics and prices at the time of initial choice. The
data’s main limitations are the fairly small number of observations and restricted set of employee
12In a few cases, an employer had a prior contract with one of the insurers. We have examined whether incorporating
this into our employee demand model aﬀects our estimates and found it did not. One concern is that this situation
could result in asymmetric information between the plans in the bidding, but we think this is unlikely to be an
important problem.
11characteristics relative to, say, the HR records of a large employer, and also the aggregated reporting
of realized costs.
The 11 ﬁrms have 2,044 covered employees and 4,652 enrollees (employees and their dependents).
We observe ﬁve of the employers for two years, creating a total of 3,683 employee-years and 6,603
enrollee-years. Table 1 provides summary statistics on the covered employees, the enrollees, and
the ﬁrms. Sixty-two percent of employees are female; the average age is just over forty. Fifty-
eight percent of enrollees are female and enrollees are younger on average than employees, driven
primarily by covered children. Twenty-eight percent of employees enroll in a plan that covers their
spouse and 27 percent enroll in a plan that covers at least one child.
Table 1 also presents risk scores at the employee, enrollee, and employer levels. A score of
one represents an average individual in a nationally representative sample, and a score of two
indicates that an individual’s expected health costs are twice the average. The average risk scores
of employees and enrollees are 1.25 and 1.01, respectively. The diﬀerence reﬂects the lower expected
expenditures for covered children. Average risk ranges widely across employers, from 0.63 to 1.91.
This variation plays a key role in our analysis. We use information on insurer bids and realized costs
to estimate models of the relationship between costs and risk. Because insurers report both bids
and costs at the employer level, variation across employers in average risk is necessary to identify
these relationships.
Table 2 provides information on the plans oﬀered by the employers in our sample. Most em-
ployers oﬀe ra l lf o u rp l a n s ,a n da l lo ﬀer both HMOs and at least one other plan. On average, the
integrated HMO is the least expensive plan and has the lowest enrollee contribution. This plan
features high rates of coinsurance, a low deductible, and a low out-of-pocket maximum. The net-
work PPO, which is oﬀered by all but one employer, is on average the most expensive plan and has
the highest employee contribution. This plan features lower coinsurance rates, higher deductibles
and higher maximum expenditures. Roughly speaking, the other two plans fall between these ex-
tremes. While bids for each plan vary substantially across tiers, reﬂecting diﬀerences in expected
expenditures based on family structure, as indicated earlier, the bids for tiers other than employee
only are simply scaled by a factor that is very similar across both plans and employers. Employee
contributions also vary across as well as within tiers. In general, employee contributions represent
a fraction of the bid and the fraction is smallest for employee only coverage.
In our demand model, we identify price elasticities based on variation across both ﬁrm-years and
12enrollment tiers in the relative contributions for diﬀerent plans. Figure 3 demonstrates the extent
and sources of variation in relative plan contributions by plotting the incremental contribution
against the incremental bid for each plan relative to the integrated HMO, which is usually the plan
requiring the lowest employee contribution. We plot contribution rates for two tiers, employee only
and employee plus spouse, to demonstrate how contributions vary across tier. For the employee
plus spouse data, we divide both the contributions and the bids by two to obtain per-enrollee prices.
There is signiﬁcant heterogeneity in contributions across employers, and across tiers. Combina-
tions of incremental contributions and bids that lie along the 45 degree line in Figure 3 represent
employers who pass on the full marginal cost of higher plan bids to employees. A subset of em-
ployers adopt this approach. Another subset of employers fully subsidize the higher cost plans,
setting incremental contributions of zero. Between these two extremes are employers who partially
subsidize higher cost plans through contribution policies. In general, employers tend to pass on a
greater portion of incremental costs for plans with dependent coverage. Figure 3 also demonstrates
the signiﬁcant variation across employers in the bids they receive for similar plans. As we demon-
strate later, this variation is driven in large part by diﬀerences across ﬁrms in the demographic
composition of employees.
We summarize enrollment patterns in Table 3. The integrated HMO attracts by far the most
enrollees with a 59% market share among employees and 60% market share among enrollees. We
also ﬁnd little evidence of extensive risk selection across the plans. The integrated HMO attracts
a slightly younger population and women, and particularly women employees, disproportionately
choose the network and integrated HMOs. But the diﬀerences across the plans in both average age
and average risk score are small. This lack of sorting is not driven by heterogeneity across ﬁrms in
the choice sets. If we condition on employers that oﬀer both the PPO and the integrated HMO,
for example, the average enrollee risk is 1.04 in both plans.
4 Econometric Model
4.1 Consumer Preferences, Plan Costs and Market Behavior
In this section, we develop an econometric model that allows us to jointly estimate consumer
preferences and health plan costs. In contrast to the simple theoretical model discussed above, the
econometric model allows for multiple plans, varying plan characteristics, and both observable and
13privately known dimensions of health risk and consumer tastes. Nevertheless, we aim for the most
parsimonious model that permits a credible assessment of market eﬃciency. In what follows, we
describe the key components of the model: consumer choice, health plan costs, health plan bidding,
and employer contribution setting, and identify the stochastic assumptions on the unobservables
that permit estimation.
Consumer Choice
We use a standard latent utility model to describe household choice behavior, where a house-
hold’s (money-metric) utility from choosing a plan depends on a combination of household and
plan characteristics. Speciﬁcally, household h’s utility from choosing plan j is:
uhj = φjαφ + xhαxj + ψ(rh + μh;αrj) − pj + σεεhj. (1)
In this representation, household utility depends on observable plan characteristics φj,t h e
monthly plan contribution pj,13 observable household demographics xh, an idiosyncratic preference
εhj, and household health risk. Our measure of household health risk is aggregated from the
individual level. For each individual i, we decompose health risk into the observable risk score
ri and additional privately known health factors μi.T h e μis capture information about health
status that may aﬀect choice behavior, but is not subject to risk adjustment. Equivalently, we can
interpret μi as measurement error in the risk score. We assume that each μi is an i.i.d. draw from
a normal distribution with mean zero and variance σ2
μ, and that the idiosyncratic tastes εhj are
i.i.d. type I extreme value random variables (i.e. logit errors).
We handle heterogeneity in household size and composition by assuming that, apart from the
treatment of health risk, each household behaves as if it had a representative member with char-
acteristics equal to the average of those of household members.14 We parameterize household risk
using two variables: the average risk of household members (i.e. the average of the ri + μi)a n d
an indicator of whether the household includes a high risk member. We deﬁne high risk as being
above 2.25, which corresponds to the 90% percentile of the observed risk score distribution. The
13We convert employee contributions, which are made with pre-tax dollars, to post-tax dollars by adjusting them
by the marginal tax rate (see Footnote 10 for discussion). For a given household h,l e tρh be the nominal contribution
and τh the household’s marginal tax rate. The tax adjusted contribution is ph =( 1− τh)ρh.
14We experimented with estimating diﬀerent weights for household members, and also with restricting the sample
to individual enrollees. Neither has much eﬀect on our results. The Appendix includes individual enrollee estimates.
14other household characteristics in the model are the averages of age and the male indicator among
covered household members as well as imputed household income.15
In addition to the employee contribution, plan characteristics φj include a dummy variable for
plan (the network HMO and PPO and the integrated HMO and POS), the relevant coinsurance
rate and deductible for the given employee, and an indicator of non-standard drug coverage.16 To
be consistent with our approach to household aggregation, we divide both the contribution and the
deductible by the number of enrollees covered by the contract.
For each household h, we observe the set of available plans Jh and the plan chosen. Let qhj be
a dummy variable indicating whether household h chooses plan j ∈ Jh. Given our speciﬁcation,
qhj =1 ⇐⇒ uhj ≥ uhk for all k ∈ Jh.( 2 )
Recall that the utility function includes two unobservables: the idiosyncratic taste εhj and the
private health risks of household members μh. Conditional on the μh’s, however, we have a standard
logit speciﬁcation. In particular, if we deﬁne vhj = uhj − εhj,a n dl e tXhj denote the full set of
relevant observables, we have the familiar formula for choice probabilities:






We model each plan j’s cost of enrolling a given individual as a function the plan’s base cost
for a “standard” enrollee with risk score 1, an adjustment based on how the forecastable risk varies
from the baseline, and an idiosyncratic health shock. Speciﬁcally, we write j’s cost of enrolling
individual i as
cij = aj + bj · (ri + μi − 1) + ηij. (4)
15We impute taxable income for each household in our sample by estimating a model of household income as a
function of worker age, sex, family structure, ﬁrm size and industry using data from the Current Population Survey
for 2004 and 2005 on workers with employer-sponsored health insurance in the corresponding state. We then use the
model to impute household income for each employee in our data incorporating random draws from the posterior
distributions of the regression coeﬃcients and the standard deviation of the residuals. Based on these predictions,
we use Taxsim to calculate marginal tax rates based on federal, state, and FICA taxes making some assumptions on
the correlation of coverage tier with ﬁling status and number of dependents. The average taxable family income and
marginal tax rate for workers in our sample are about $73,00 and 41%, respectively.
16While the prescription drug coverage for each plan is complicated, comprised of both formulate restrictions and
tiered cost sharing, it is generally standardized within pla n sa c r o s se m p l o y e r s . T h i sv a r i a b l ei sa ni n d i c a t o ro ft h e
t w oe m p l o y e r sw h o s ec o v e r a g ed e v i a t e sf r o mt h es t a n dard. In both cases, the coverage is less generous.
15In this speciﬁcation, aj represents plan j’s baseline expected cost for a standard enrollee, and
bj is the marginal cost of insuring a higher (or lower) health risk. Again we decompose forecastable
health risk into the observable risk score ri and the private information component μi. We allow
b o t ht h eb a s ec o s taj and the marginal cost bj to depend on plan characteristics, most importantly
the underlying plan type. We assume that each ηij is an independent mean-zero random variable.
Our cost data are aggregated to the insurer-ﬁrm-year level so we aggregate the individual cost
model accordingly. Let Ijf denote the set of enrollees in plan j in ﬁrm-year f,a n dl e tJkf be the
set of plans oﬀered by insurer k. (To keep subscripts manageable, we use f rather than ft to index











The next component of our model is the plan bids. As described above, in a ﬁrm’s ﬁrst year of
participation, each insurer had the same limited information about each ﬁrm, namely the age and
sex of employees but not dependents. The intermediary instructed insurers to bid assuming they
were covering all workers within the ﬁrm, assuring them that the payments they received would be
adjusted based on the risk scores of actual enrollees.
We assume that the insurers bid roughly as instructed, submitting a marked-up estimate of the
their costs for insuring all employees at each given ﬁrm under a particular plan. We also assume that
insurers bid based only on the information available from the intermediary. To ensure the validity
of this assumption, we limit the data to ﬁrst-year bids when the insurers had no experience with a
particular employer. The fact that each ﬁrm represents only a tiny fraction of each insurer’s business
also supports the plausibility of this assumption. To the extent that providers were concerned about
unfavorable risk selection, it seems likely that they would simply bid a larger proﬁt margin for all
coverage sold through the intermediary rather than investing eﬀort to collect additional information
to ﬁne-tune each bid.
To formalize the model, let If denote the set of employees in ﬁrm f,a n dxi the demographic
information about employee i that was available to the insurers, i.e. age and sex. The expected





E[cij|xi]=aj + bj(E[rf|xf] − 1), (6)
where rf denotes the average risk of employees in ﬁrm f, which the insurer forecasts using the
available demographic information, xf.17
We model expected plan bids as a mark-up over expected cost. So plan j’s bid for ﬁrm f is:
Bjf = δj · (aj + bj · (E[rf|xf] − 1)) + νjf,( 7 )
where νjf is an independent mean zero random variable. The new parameter introduced in the
bid model is the mark-up δj. We constrain the mark-up to be constant across the plans oﬀered
by a particular insurer. Although in theory an insurer could vary the mark-up across its diﬀerent
plans, because the cost data are at the insurer-ﬁrm level, we are unable to identify separately the
mark-up and the ﬁx e dc o s t sf o re a c hp l a no ﬀered by an insurer. Naturally we expect the mark-up
parameters to be larger than one.
Employer Contribution Setting
T h el a s tp a r to fo u rm o d e ls p e c i ﬁes how employers set required plan contributions. We adopt a
simple model in which employers pass on a fraction of their cost for the lowest cost plan, and then
a fraction of the incremental cost for higher cost plans. We allow these fractions, denoted β and γ,
to vary across ﬁrm-years and coverage tiers.
Let Blf denote the minimum bid received for coverage tier l in ﬁrm-year f,d e n o t ep l a nj’s bid
for coverage tier l in ﬁrm-year f as Bjlf. We model the required contribution as:
pjlf = βlf · Blf + γlf · (Bjlf − Blf)+ξjlf. (8)
This model describes employer behavior in our data remarkably well. The residuals from the
linear regression (8) have a standard deviation of 7.64, and the R-squared is 0.99. As noted above,
approximately half of the ﬁrms in our data choose a "proportional pass-through" strategy where
β = γ. The others choose an "incremental pass-through" strategy in which β<γ .
17We construct E[r|x] by regressing risk score on fully interacted dummy variables for age group and sex.
174.2 Discussion of Model and Identiﬁcation
The key quantities in our model are plan costs and plan demand as functions of forecastable risk,
and the price elasticity of demand. The former determine the eﬃcient allocation of households
to plans, while the latter determines how price changes aﬀect self-selection. We now discuss the
variation in the data that identiﬁes each of these quantities in estimation.
Identifying plan costs is straightforward. The eﬀect of forecastable risk on plan costs is identiﬁed
by variation across ﬁrms in the average risk scores of workers and dependents, and how it aﬀects
insurer bids and realized costs. We identify the mark-up parameters, δj, by the diﬀerence between
the plan bids and reported costs. A maintained assumption in estimating mark-ups is that insurers
base their bids on only the information about employees that is provided by the intermediary. We
discuss this assumption more below, but we believe it is reasonable given the small size of the
contracts and the fact that we consider only the ﬁrst year of plan bids.
The eﬀect of household risk on choice behavior (i.e. the coeﬃcients αrj in the demand equation)
is identiﬁe db yv a r i a t i o ni no b s e r v a b l er i s ka c r o s sh o u s e holds. Our model also allows private infor-
mation about health status to aﬀect choice. The key parameter here is the variance of the private
information, σ2
μ, which is identiﬁed by the correlation between consumers’ enrollment decisions and
plans’ realized costs. This identiﬁcation is aided by cross-ﬁr mv a r i a t i o ni nc o n t r i b u t i o np o l i c i e sa n d
demographics that, conditional on observable health risk, aﬀect enrollment but not realized costs.18
T h em o s ts u b t l ei d e n t i ﬁcation issues arise in estimating the eﬀect of plan contributions on
demand. Plan contributions are the result of plan bids and employer pass-through decisions. Our
model allows four sources of variation in contributions: cross-ﬁrm variation in demographics (xf)
that leads plans to submit diﬀerent bids, idiosyncratic variation in plan bids (νjf), cross-ﬁrm
and cross-tier variation in employer pass-through rates (γjlf), and idiosyncratic variation in the
plan contributions (ξjlf).19 There is substantial variation in each of the ﬁrst three variables. For
instance, the diﬀerence in the bids for the integrated HMO and the network PPO ranges from $50
to $150 per month (Figure 3), with a large fraction due to cross-ﬁrm variation in demographic risk.
Similarly, some employers in our data pass through the full incremental diﬀerence in plan bids,
while others pass through only a fraction or in some cases none at all (Figure 3).
18Our demand model also includes plan characteristics such as coinsurance and deductible. Their coeﬃcients are
identiﬁed oﬀ cross-ﬁrm and cross-tier variation in the characteristics.
19We also introduce variation in employee contributions through the imputed marginal tax rates, but we control
for imputed income and relevant household demographics in the demand equation.
18The availability of multiple sources of variation permits some ﬂexibility in estimating price
elasticities. Recall that accurate identiﬁcation requires using price variation that is not correlated
with idiosyncratic household tastes εhj or privately known health risk μh. Our baseline estimates
use all four sources of variation. We also employ instrumental variables to isolate diﬀerent sources
of variation. The instruments are predicted plan contributions based on alternative covariates.
T h eb o t t o ml i n ef r o mt h e s es p e c i ﬁcations is that our price elasticity estimates are quite robust to
focusing on diﬀerent sources of variation in contributions. This robustness, despite our relatively
small sample, suggests that endogeneity may not be an important concern, at least in this setting.
Nevertheless, we now discuss the issues in detail.
Perhaps the most obvious identiﬁcation concern is that employers believe their employees will
prefer a particular plan and price accordingly. This could mean catering to employees with a low
contribution, or setting a high contribution to pass on costs. Either would generate a correlation
between the idiosyncratic part of the contribution ξjlf and household preferences εhj. To mitigate
this concern, we instrument for the actual plan contribution using the predicted value (ˆ pjlf)f r o mt h e
contribution model (8). We take this as our preferred speciﬁcation in performing welfare analysis
although the results are similar to theb a s e l i n ec a s ew i t hn oi n s t r u m e n t s .
A second concern is that plan bids are correlated with unobserved household tastes. This could
happen if an insurer believed its plan was attractive due to, say, a nearby clinic location. It would
generate a correlation between the idiosyncratic bid component, νjf, and household preferences
εhj. We view this problem as most likely of marginal importance given the limited information on
the part of insurers. Nevertheless, we check our estimates by instrumenting for plan contribution
with a predicted value that is constructed by plugging the predicted bid ˆ Bjf from (7) into the
contribution model (8). This speciﬁcation purges the variation in both νjf and ξjlf.T h er e s u l t s
are similar to our preferred speciﬁcation.
A third issue for identiﬁcation is that employer pass-through rates might be systematically
inﬂuenced by employee preferences. This also seems unlikely, mainly because pass-through rates in
our data are uncorrelated with observable diﬀerences across ﬁrms. Figure 4 plots employer pass-
through rates against employee health status, dependent health status, worker income and ﬁrm size.
There is no correlation, suggesting that cross-ﬁrm diﬀerences in contribution policies may be due
more to idiosyncratic factors, such as management philosophy, than employee tastes. Nevertheless,
we again use an IV strategy to verify that our results are not driven by a correlation between the
19pass-through coeﬃcients γjlf and unobserved preferences εhj. To this end, we instrument for plan
contribution using predicted values from a variant of the contribution model (8) in which pass-
through coeﬃcients are restricted to be identical across ﬁrms. This purges cross-ﬁrm variation in
γjlf as well as the variation in ξjlf. The results are again similar although with large standard
errors.20
4.3 Estimation Strategy
We estimate the model using the method of simulated moments. A method of moments estimator is
useful because it allows us to combine the information in consumer choices, plan costs and plan bids,
each of which is observed at a diﬀerent level of aggregation. We estimate the employer contribution
model separately, by OLS regression, and use it to construct instruments for the plan prices as
discussed above.
Our ﬁrst set of moments come from consumer choice. For each household h, we have:
Eε [qhj − Pr(qhj =1| Xh) | Zh,μ h]=0 . (9)
In this equation, the Xh are the household covariates, and Zh denotes the same vector with plan
contributions replaced by the relevant predicted contributions for the IV speciﬁcations. Equation
(3) above provides the logit formula for Pr(qhj =1 |Xh,μ h).









{aj + bj · (ri + μi − 1)}|Xkf,μ kf
⎤
⎦ =0 . (10)
Here Xkf contains the relevant characteristics of enrollees and plans in the given ﬁrm-insurer-year,
including the observed risk rkf of insurer k’s enrollees, and μkf are the unobserved risks of these
enrollees.
The ﬁnal moment conditions come from plan bids. For each ﬁrm-plan during a ﬁrm’s ﬁrst year
20A ﬁnal identiﬁcation concern is that household choices may be inﬂuenced by the health status of their co-
employees, leading to a correlation between rf and εhj and hence between phj and εhj. To check on this issue, we
tried including rf as an explanatory variable in our baseline demand model. The results were again similar.
20of participation, we have:
Eν [Bjf − δj · (aj + bj · (E[rf|xf] − 1)) | Xf]=0 . (11)
Here Xf contains the demographic information on ﬁrm f available to the insurers.
Each conditional expectation is of the form E[hτ(θ,Xn,μ n) | Zn,μ n],w h e r eθ are the unknown
parameters, Xn are the observables for observation n, Zn are instruments and μn the unobserved
health risk. We let τ =1 ,2,3 index the choice, cost and bid equations, respectively.21 Following
the standard GMM approach, we create moments mτ (θ,Xn,Z n,μ n)=Z0
n · hτ (θ,Xn,μ),w i t h
the property that E[mτ (θ0,X n,Z n,μ n)] = 0.L e t m(θ,X,Z,μ) denote the vector obtained by
stacking all of moment conditions. This vector depends on the unobserved health risks, but we
can integrate over the distribution of those risks (assumed normal with mean zero and variance
σ2
μ)t oo b t a i nm(θ,X,Z)=
R
mτ (θ,X,Z,μ)dFμ(μ). Again these moments have the property that
E[m(θ0,X n,Z n)] = 0.
In practice, we construct m(θ,X,Z) using simulation to approximate the integral. For each








. We then obtain parameter estimates in typical fashion by constructing
the sample analogue ˆ m(θ)= 1
N
PN
n=1 ˜ m(θ,Xn,Z n), and choosing ˆ θ =argminθ∈Θ ˆ m(θ)0W ˆ m(θ). For
eﬃciency, we set W = {E[ˆ m(θ)ˆ m(θ)0]}
−1 following the standard two-step process.
4.4 Welfare Measurement
We use the estimated model to compare market allocations and social welfare under alternative
contribution policies. Here we explain brieﬂyh o wt h e s ee ﬀects are calculated. For any given set of
plan prices, household choice probabilities and expected plan costs can be computed easily using the
above formulas so long as the private risks (μ’s) are known. As we do not observe μ, we integrate
over its distribution by taking simulation draws for each individual, calculating choice probabilities
and expected plan costs, and then averaging over simulation draws.
Changes in social welfare are calculated in similar fashion. Following Small and Rosen (1981),
the expected change in the money-metric utility of household h following a price change from p to
21We slightly abuse notation by letting n index observations on choices, costs and bids, despite the fact that the






















A subtlety here is that our model of household choice invokes a representative household mem-
ber, so to give each individual equal welfare weight, we scale each household by the number of











To calculate changes in producer surplus, it is convenient to treat the employer and the insurers
together, netting out the various transfers between them. The change in the producer surplus














Pr(qhj =1 |phj)(phj − ce
hj) .
where ce
hj is the expected cost of covering household h in plan j. This cost, and the choice prob-
abilities are again conditional on household unobserved risk, μh, but we can integrate over the
distribution of μh to obtain ∆Πh (p,p0).















To calculate ∆S in practice, we draw values of μ for each individual in the data, calculate
∆Uh (p,p0,μ h) and ∆Πh (p,p0,μ h) for each simulation draw, and average over the draws to obtain
∆Uh (p,p0) and ∆Πh (p,p0). Adding up across households yields the desired quantities.
Below, we also solve for prices that are optimal given various constraints (e.g. not risk-rated,
risk-rated based on observable risk, etc.) To do this, we nest the social welfare calculation inside a
gradient-based optimization routine in Matlab, solve for optimal prices, and then use a grid search
to check for global optimality.
225 Empirical Results
In this section, we report estimates of the model parameters and calculations of market allocation
and social welfare under alternative pricing policies and choice sets.
5.1 Model Estimates
Table 4 presents parameter estimates from three diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the demand model.22
The ﬁrst column is a baseline model where we do not instrument for plan contributions, and do not
allow for private information about household risk. The second and third columns instrument for
plan contributions using the predicted values from the contribution model (8). The third column,
which is our preferred speciﬁcation, allows for private information about risk. To scale the utility
to money-metric form, we divide each coeﬃcient by the coeﬃcient on the monthly contribution
and adjust the standard errors accordingly. We report the price eﬀects as semi-elasticities at the
bottom of the table.
Eﬀect of Demographics and Risk on Choice
The demand estimates indicate that overall sorting on the basis of risk is rather modest, but that
diﬀerent plans experience unfavorable selection across diﬀering components risk. Older employees,
w h oo na v e r a g ec o s tm o r et oi n s u r e ,p r e f e rt h en e t w o r kH M Oa n dt h ei n t e g r a t e dP O Sp l a nt ot h e
integrated HMO. An additional year of age is associated with an increase in the willingness to pay
for the network HMO relative to the integrated HMO of $1.75 per month (Column 1). Women,
who at the age of workers in our data typically cost more to insure than men, prefer the integrated
HMO to either the integrated POS plan or the network PPO. Women are willing to pay $35 per
month less than men for the network PPO relative to the integrated HMO (Column 1). The eﬀects
of age and sex are not particularly sensitive to the use of instruments for the employee contribution
(Column 2) or the incorporation of unobserved risk (Column 3).
We ﬁnd some sorting on the basis of health status conditional on age and sex, driven primarily
by having a very high risk household member. The eﬀects of the linear risk score on plan choice
are generally small and imprecise. Households with a high risk member, however, are less likely
to enroll in the network HMO and more likely to enroll in the network PPO than the integrated
22The Table does not report every parameter. The parameters not reported are the plan ﬁxed eﬀects, and the
coeﬃcients on imputed household income and an indicator for non-standard drug coverage.
23HMO. In our preferred speciﬁcation (Column 3), an employee with a high risk family member is
willing to pay $28 per month more than an employee without a high risk family member to enroll
in the network PPO relative to the integrated HMO.
Our results also suggest that private information about health risk plays a role in plan choice,
although the estimate is not very precise. We estimate that the standard deviation of private risk
information σμ is 0.68, which is substantial relative to the standard deviation of the observed risk
scores (1.56 in Table 1). Roughly speaking, observed risk scores appear to pick up just over 2/3 of
the health status information that factors into plan choice.
While our ﬁndings with respect to risk selection are not inconsistent with existing research,
they suggest a relatively complex pattern of sorting. Much of the existing literature ﬁnds evidence
of unfavorable selection into more generous plans (e.g. Cutler and Zeckhauser, 2000; Glied, 2000).
We also ﬁnd that the highest risk enrollees favor the most ﬂexible plan, the network PPO. Overall,
however, the average risk across plans is quite similar due to oﬀ-setting selection along diﬀerent
demographic dimensions, including age and gender, that are correlated with risk. This ﬁnding is
consistent with the idea that the plans cater to individuals with diﬀerent tastes for health care,
rather than oﬀering diﬀerent quantities of care, or targeting individuals of diﬀerent health status.
Eﬀe c to fP l a nP r i c e so nC h o i c e
In the bottom panel, we present price semi-elasticities of demand, deﬁned as the percentage
decrease in market share resulting from a $100 increase in the annual enrollee contribution, eval-
uated at the mean choice probability for each plan. On average, a $100 dollar increase in the
annual enrollee contribution decreases market share by 7 to 9 percent. While instrumenting the
contribution reduces the precision of the estimate of the price eﬀect, it has relatively little eﬀect on
its magnitude. These estimates suggest that demand is relatively inelastic; a ﬁnding that accords
with most prior studies of plan choice. Existing studies estimate that a $100 (inﬂation adjusted)
increase in the annual contribution reduces market share by 1.6 to 9.6 percent, placing our estimate
in the middle to high end of those of existing studies.23
23Studies in setting similar to ours vary in the method for reporting elasticities. Following Chernew et. al. (2007),
we reconcile the estimates of price elasticity across studies by converting them to semi-elastiticies (calculated as the
percent change in market share in response to an increase of $100 in the employee contribution). Because the studies
cover diﬀerent time periods, we adjust the change in the employee contribution for inﬂation. After making these
adjustments, most studies estimate semi- elastiticities in the range of -1.5 to -3.5 (Chernew et. al 2007; Chernew et.
al 2003; Strombom, et. al 2002; Wedig and Tai-Seale 2002; Cutler and Reber 1998). Estimates from Royalty and
24The results in Table 4 also include the estimated value of plan characteristics other than price,
such as coinsurance rate and deductible. Enrollees appear to be moderately sensitive to both. We
estimate that a 10 percentage point increase in the coinsurance rate is valued at approximately
$276 dollars annually, which is about 10 percent of the annual cost per enrollee reported by the
insurers. Our estimates indicate that enrollees are not particularly sensitive to the deductible when
choosing among plans.24
Demand Model Sensitivity Analyses
Because the estimates of risk and price elasticity are the key parameters for our welfare cal-
culations, we have examined the sensitivity of these estimates with respect to a variety of issues.
We brieﬂy summarize these analyses here, providing some more detailed results in Appendix Table
A1. Our main speciﬁcations pool data from enrollees in diﬀerent coverage tiers. This increases the
sample size and generates additional variation in plan contributions due to the higher pass-through
rates for dependent coverage tiers, but requires us to make assumptions about household aggrega-
tion. We test whether our estimates are sensitive to these assumptions by restricting the sample
to employees purchasing employee-only coverage (Table A1 - Column 2) and also by controlling
for family structure in our full-sample speciﬁcation (Table A1 - Column 3). Both variations give
similar results to our preferred speciﬁcation (Table A1 - Column 1).25
A sd i s c u s s e di nS e c t i o n4 . 2 ,w ed e v e l o p e dd i ﬀerent instruments to exploit alternative sources
of identifying variation in employee contributions and hence test the robustness of our estimates
to diﬀerent assumptions regarding potential sources of endogeneity. In Table 4 (Column 3), we
demonstrate that the estimate of the price eﬀect is robust to idiosyncratic variation in employer
contribution setting. The results in Table A1 demonstrate that the estimate of the price eﬀect does
not appear to be aﬀected by endogeneity in either insurer bidding (Column 5) or employer choice
of pass through rates (Column 4).
Solomon 1999 are somewhat higher (ranging from -2.4 to -21.1). Similarly, Jin and Sorensen (2005), who analyze
retirees, have an estimate that implies a semi-elastiticity of -9.0. At the extremes, estimates from Feldman, Dowd
and Cassou (1989) imply semi-elastiticies of -19.0 to -63.0, and Barringer and Mitchell (1984) ﬁnd semi-elastiticies of
less than -0.15.
24The results are unchanged when out-of-pocket maximum are included as plan characteristics.
25While the estimate of the eﬀect of being a high risk individual on demand for the network PPO is smaller in
magnitude in the employee-only than in the full sample, the estimate is imprecise likely because it is identiﬁed by a
small number of enrollees (Column 1). When we include controls for family structure in the model estimated on the
full sample, we ﬁnd that families with a spouse seem to prefer the PPO relative to the average household (Column
2).
25Finally, we note that while we present results from relatively parsimonious model, our estimates
do not appear to be sensitive to including a variety of diﬀerent control variables. Additional controls
we have explored include plan out-of-pocket maximums, whether a plan was oﬀered to an employer
group prior to the employer hiring the intermediary, and whether an employee is making his or her
initial plan choice or a later plan choice.
Structure of Plan Costs
The estimate from the bid and cost models in Table 5 indicate that the integrated and network
insurers have quite diﬀerent cost structures. Expected costs do not diﬀer much across plans for
an enrollee of average risk. The expected monthly cost for an enrollee with a risk score of one is
$235 for the integrated HMO, $236 for the integrated POS, $218 for the network HMO, and $238
for the network PPO. The integrated insurer, however, has a substantial cost advantage for higher
risk enrollees. The expected monthly cost of an enrollee with a risk score of two is $309 for the
integrated HMO, $425 for the integrated POS, $507 for the network HMO and $413 for the network
PPO. The mark-up varies across insurers. We estimate that the network insurer bids 24% over
expected costs and the integrated insurer bids 8% over costs.
The diﬀerence in cost structures can be seen even in the raw data depicted in Figures 5 and
6. Figure 5 is a scatterplot of enrollee risk scores against realized costs. Each point corresponds
to an insurer-ﬁrm-year. The x-axis is the average risk of the insurer’s enrollees; the y-axis is the
reported costs per enrollee. The lines represent the model’s prediction of expected costs for the
network PPO and the integrated HMO. Figure 6 displays corresponding information for bids. It
shows the average risk of a ﬁrm’s employees plotted against plan bids, with each observation at the
plan-ﬁrm-year level. As the Figures illustrate, the integrated plans appear to have a cost advantage
in covering higher risk enrollees. In contrast, the network plans do relatively well for low risks.
The clear patterns in the ﬁgures also indicate why we obtain fairly precise cost estimates despite a
small number of observations.
The structure of plan costs we estimate is consistent with the basic idea that patient cost sharing
may be eﬀective at limiting provider visits while supply-side mechanisms may be more eﬀective at
limiting costs conditional on receiving services (see, e.g., Newhouse 1993). While we do not have
visit-level data to support the claim, the steep cost curves for the network plans are consistent
with a story where cost sharing limits visits, particularly for low risks, but has little eﬀect on the
26high risks who consume healthcare on the intensive margin. In contrast, the integrated plans with
their relatively low cost sharing but stronger supply side utilization controls may be less eﬀective at
limiting provider visits for low risks but more eﬀective at managing costs conditional on provider
visit for the high risks.
The sensitivity of cost diﬀerentials as a function of enrollee risk, compared to the relatively
modest eﬀect of risk on plan preferences, has an important implication. It indicates that as con-
sumer risk varies, changes in relative plan costs rather than changes in preferences will drive the
eﬃcient allocation. As our simple theory model illustrated, this will not happen under self-selection
without a mechanism that allows prices diﬀerent risk groups to face diﬀerent premium diﬀerentials.
In our setting, prices do not have this feature, suggesting the potential for ineﬃciency. We return
to this point in the next section, when we quantify social welfare.
Af a c t o rt ok e e pi nm i n dw h e ne v a l u a t i n go u re s t i m a t e so fp l a nc o s t si st h a tw eo b s e r v et h e
insurers’ costs of coverage, not the overall dollars spent on care. The distinction is important
because, in plans with copayments and deductibles, enrollees bear a share of the cost of care that
we do not capture in our data. These payments are largest at the network PPO and smallest
at the integrated HMO. While our model assumes that these payments will be internalized in
making plan choices, they do aﬀect the interpretation of the eﬀects of the diﬀerent plan types on
utilization of care. In particular,the reduction in insured costs for low risks in the network plan
may represent, at least in part, a shift from insured to uninsured payments, rather than a reduction
in utilization or prices. For high risks, in contrast, the diﬀerence in insured costs between the plans
likely underestimates the extent to which the integrated plan reduces total costs.
5.2 Quantifying Social Welfare Ineﬃciencies
In this section, we use the estimated demand and cost model to compute the ineﬃciency associated
with observed contribution policies relative to alternative eﬃcient benchmarks. We also compare
welfare between the observed policies and alternative uniform contribution policies to demonstrate
the extent to which the ineﬃciency associated with a uniform contribution could be reduced within
the current institutional constraints. Table 6 presents the results of these simulations. The left-hand
panels present the market share, average enrollee risk, and the average incremental contribution
for each plan under ﬁve diﬀerent pricing scenarios. The incremental contribution represents the
monthly contribution per enrollee relative to the integrated HMO averaged across all households.
27The right-hand panels present information on the change in surplus relative to the observed allo-
cation for each scenario.
The Welfare Cost of Observed Prices
In the top panels, we calculate the ineﬃciency of observed pricing policies relative to two risk-
rated benchmarks. The ﬁrst is individual risk rating based on the observed risk scores. This pricing
policy, which we refer to as “feasible risk-rated contributions”, maximizes social welfare conditional
on knowledge of the risk scores, but not each household’s private information. The third panel
of the Table reports outcomes when prices are ﬁrst-best, i.e. risk-rated based on both public and
private information.
Overall, under risk-rated contributions, high-risk households face higher premiums and low-risk
households face somewhat lower premiums for the network plans relative to observed contribution
policies. In both the feasible and ﬁrst-best scenarios, this leads to a substantial re-allocation of
enrollees across plans, although overall market shares change modestly. With feasible risk-rating,
the average enrollee risk at the integrated HMO increases from its observed level of 0.99 to 1.49, and
the network HMO experiences a decline in average enrollee risk from 1.03 to 0.58. This reallocation
of households across plans substantially reduces overall insurer costs, by $44 per enrollee-month,
and increases total social surplus by just over $27 per enrollee-month. The increase in social welfare
represents approximately 11% of average insurer costs in our sample.
A substantial fraction of the welfare gain is due to the highest and lowest risk households making
more eﬃcient plan choices. Table 7 decomposes the welfare calculation by household risk quintiles.
The lowest and highest risk quintiles (average household risk below 0.36 and above 1.33) generate
about three-quarters of the welfare eﬀect. This raises a concern that our calculation might be driven
in part by extrapolating plan costs out of sample. As Figures 5 and 6 illustrate, we observe plan
bids and costs only for average risk scores between 0.75 and 2.0. In contrast, household risk ranges
from 0.16 to 30.1. To address this, we truncate the cost diﬀerentials between plans at their 0.75
and 2.0 levels and re-calculate the welfare numbers. These calculations appear in the ﬁnal columns
of Tables 6 and 7. We view the numbers based on truncated cost diﬀerences as a lower bound
on welfare diﬀerences, and the baseline numbers based on straight-line extrapolation as closer to
an upper bound. Truncating the cost diﬀerentials has little eﬀect on the resulting assignment of
households to plans, but as one might expect, it reduces the welfare cost of observed pricing to $5
28per enrollee-month, or 2% of insurer costs, relative to the feasible optimum.
It is also interesting to compare what is possible using prices based on observed risk scores
to what in principle could be achieved using both observed risk scores and households’ private
information. This calculation captures the extent to which private information on risk constrains
the eﬃciency of feasible relative to optimal risk-rated pricing. Changing from feasible risk rated
contributions to the ﬁrst-best scenario increases social surplus by between $2 and $8 per enrollee-
month, depending on the treatment of costs for extreme risk, or roughly 1-3 percent of insurer costs.
One way to interpret this is that, in our sample, a social planner could achieve approximately 70% of
the potential welfare gains associated with individualized pricing using only observable information
on risk.
Social Welfare without Risk-Rating
The calculations above indicate that the observed prices fall well short of the eﬃcient bench-
mark. A natural question is whether eﬃciency gains could be realized even without risk-rated
contributions. That is, to the extent re-allocating high and low risk households would increase so-
cial welfare, is it possible to induce this reallocation given current institutional pricing constraints?
At ﬁrst glance, the answer is unclear. After all, current institutions require uniform pricing within
ﬁrm-tiers, but this still allows a fair amount of pricing ﬂexibility within our sample. For example,
average risk varies substantially across the ﬁrms in our data, suggesting that cross-ﬁrm variation in
contribution policies could alleviate some of the ineﬃciency associated with uniform contributions.
The next scenario in Table 6 addresses the question of what is possible without individualized
pricing by considering contributions that maximize social welfare subject to being uniform within
each ﬁrm-tier. As in the case of fully risk-rated prices, optimizing uniform within ﬁrm contributions
leads to a reallocation of high-risk households into the integrated plans and away from the network
plans, particularly the PPO. The shift is much less dramatic, however, than under full risk rating.
Overall social surplus is $1.40-6.70 higher per enrollee-month than under the observed policies, but
still $3.60-20.40 below the eﬃcient level. This indicates that about 3/4 of the observed ineﬃciency
is due to the requirement of nondiscriminatory pricing within ﬁrms. Nevertheless, it appears that
employers could increase social surplus by around 1-3% of average insurer costs simply by adjusting
their contributions to better reﬂect diﬀerences in underlying plan costs.
One diﬃculty for employers, of course, is that matching contributions to plan costs may be a
29fairly complex exercise. Many beneﬁts consultants, including the intermediary in our data, suggest a
simpler approach, which is to pass on the full incremental premium for all but the lowest priced plan.
We refer to this as the “Enthoven Rule.” About 1/2 of the ﬁrms in our sample use this approach.
T h el a s te n t r yi nT a b l e6c o n s i d e r st h ee ﬀect of moving all the ﬁrms to an Enthoven-style approach.
Perhaps surprisingly, this has relatively little eﬀect on overall welfare, or on household choices. The
reason is that demand is not very price elastic and from a practical standpoint most ﬁrms already
pass through a substantial fraction of the premium diﬀerentials. So relative to the price changes
needed to move substantial numbers of households across plans, a change to an Enthoven policy
has only a modest eﬀect on choices.
This last observation raises an important point for our pricing experiments. The relatively low
elasticity of demand means that the contribution diﬀerentials needed to re-allocate households in
the direction of eﬃciency are sizeable. For instance, maximizing welfare while keeping contributions
uniform within ﬁrm-tiers would lead to some households seeing a $87 per-enrollee monthly premium
for the network PPO relative to the integrated HMO. A move to eﬃcient risk-rated prices would
increase this diﬀerential even more for some high-cost households. For instance, an individual
employee with a risk score of 3 would face a monthly premium diﬀerential of between $101 and
$202 depending on our cost extrapolation. These large price diﬀerentials indicate that achieving
eﬃcient allocations may raise issues of fairness or aﬀordability of coverage for particular subgroups.
5.3 The Value of Plan Choice
By choosing to oﬀer beneﬁts through the intermediary, each of the ﬁrms in our sample moved from
oﬀering a single health plan to oﬀering multiple plans from two carriers. A clear beneﬁto fp l a n
choice is that households with diﬀerent preferences can select their preferred plan. Our estimates
indicate a substantial amount of preference heterogeneity, and hence suggest substantial welfare
gains from giving households multiple plan options.
To illustrate this, we compare aggregate surplus under the observed oﬀerings to the surplus
that would be obtained if all the households in our sample were enrolled in one of the four plans.
The most natural benchmark is the integrated HMO, as it would be the most eﬃcient single-plan
oﬀering for every ﬁrm in our data. Relative to the integrated HMO benchmark, the observed
plan oﬀerings increase social welfare by almost $70 per enrollee-month for the ﬁrms in our data.
Virtually all of this is due to an increase in consumer surplus (gross of plan contributions) rather
30than to a reduction in insurer costs. Indeed, insurer costs would be lowest if all households were
enrolled in the network HMO but the reduction in social surplus would be large due the reduction
in consumer surplus.
One caveat to this calculation is the logit demand speciﬁcation is notorious for generating large
“new product” welfare gains. Roughly speaking, the problem is that each new product adds a new
preference dimension, and some households invariably enjoy a large welfare gain from this addition
due to the logit distributional assumption. So while we think the beneﬁts of plan choice are real,
we urge some caution in interpreting the magnitude of the measured eﬀect.
5.4 Discussion and Sensitivity Analysis
Our results indicate that employers’ observed contribution policies lead to a notable ineﬃciency
in plan enrollment. Our baseline estimate is that the welfare loss is on the order of 2-11% of the
costs of coverage. This loss arises because households do not face incremental plan contributions
that accurately reﬂect incremental costs of coverage. Because our results are based on a small
set of employers in a particular geographic area, it is not clear whether our ﬁndings are broadly
generalizable. Thus, it is useful to compare our results to those from the relatively small literature
quantifying the eﬃciency of health insurance markets (Cutler and Reber 1998, Carlin and Town
2007, and Einav, Finkelstein and Cullen 2008).
As noted above, one diﬀerence between our study and these other recent papers is the choice of
the eﬃcient benchmark. In particular, the papers just mentioned consider only pricing schemes in
which contributions are uniform across individuals. Unless preferences are perfectly correlated with
health risk, or plan cost diﬀerentials are precisely the same in dollar terms for each consumer, this
is a constrained notion of eﬃciency. In our context, the analogous exercise is to compare welfare
under observed pricing to optimal uniform pricing. We found that this implies a welfare loss of
approximately 1-3% of coverage costs, or about 25% of the welfare diﬀerence between the observed
outcome and the feasible eﬃcient outcome. It would be interesting to know if this conclusion is
speciﬁc to our environment or more general.
What we can compare across studies is the estimated welfare loss from non-optimal uniform
pricing, and there appears to be a reasonable amount of consistency in this regard. Cutler and
Reber calculate that a change in Harvard University’s contribution policy generated a welfare loss
31on the order of 2-4% of coverage costs.26 U s i n gd a t ao np l a nd e m a n da n dr e a l i z e dc o s t sf r o ma
diﬀerent and even larger employer, Einav, Finkelstein and Cullen calculate that moving from zero-
proﬁt plan contributions to the most eﬃcient uniform contribution could increase welfare by up to
2%. Finally, Carlin and Town (2007) study a third large employer and ﬁnd the plan pricing has
little eﬀect on aggregate welfare, primarily because demand is quite price inelastic in the setting
they examine.
Underlying the similarities in these estimates, however, are very diﬀerent market environments.
For example, in the episode studied by Cutler and Reber (1998), Harvard modiﬁed its contribution
policy to link the employee contribution for the PPO relative to HMO plans to the observed
premium diﬀerential between the plans. While they estimate a price elasticity very similar to ours
– a $100 increase in the annual employee contribution translates into about a 3% decrease in plan
market share – they ﬁnd that the PPO experienced unfavorable selection prior to the introduction
of the policy and the degree of unfavorable selection into the PPO increased after the relative price
increase. Diﬀerences in the plan oﬀerings may explain their ﬁnding of substantial risk-selection.
In the Harvard market, the PPO and the HMO may have been primarily vertically diﬀerentiated,
with PPO enrollees getting “more” coverage. As we have discussed, plans in our setting seem to
be more horizontally diﬀerentiated. A related point is that Cutler and Reber do not have a health
status measure, so they measure risk selection based only on age. Our estimates suggest that
diﬀering components of risk may aﬀect selection in diﬀerent ways, particularly when products are
horizontally diﬀerentiated.
Carlin and Town’s (2007) paper is similar to ours in attempting to estimate both a demand
system and cost structures for diﬀerent plans, although the setting is quite diﬀerent. Like us,
they ﬁnd that plans have quite diﬀerent cost structures, so there are substantial cost savings to
be realized by eﬃciently allocating enrollees to plans. They also uncover evidence of risk-based
self-selection. At the same time, however, they ﬁnd that demand is quite inelastic. Roughly, a $100
increase in the annual employee contribution translates into only about a 1% decrease, or less, in
market share. This leads them to conclude that prices don’t have much aﬀect on the plan choice and
hence on aggregate welfare. One explanation for their estimate of highly inelastic demand is that
they rely on time-series variation in contributions. The literature on health plan choice suggests
26Cutler and Reber lacked data on plan costs, so they assumed that the PPO’s cost of covering individuals was
roughly $200 per year more than the HMOs, independent of risk. This diﬀerence was more or less the incremental
contribution for the PPO under Harvard’s original policy, so they designate that policy to be the eﬃcient benchmark.
32that employees may be more price sensitive in making initial choices than in making changes once
they are enrolled.
Einav, Finkelstein and Cullen (2008) also use data from a single large employer to estimate both
plan demand and plan costs. In their case, the plans are PPOs with diﬀerent levels of cost-sharing.
As in earlier studies of vertically diﬀerentiated plans, they ﬁnd substantial adverse selection for
the more generous plan, once again pointing to the potential importance of sources of product
diﬀerentiation. Methodologically, their paper is also a bit diﬀerent in that they simply specify
demand and cost as a function of price, rather than using a characteristics-based model as we do
here.
Taken together, these studies reinforce our earlier observation that the welfare consequences of
ineﬃcient pricing are driven by two factors: ﬁrst, the cost of ineﬃcient sorting, which is a function of
employee preferences and plan costs; and second, the price elasticity of demand, which determines
the sensitivity of self-selection to price. While we have gone to some length to document the
robustness of our estimates along both dimensions, our sample is nonetheless small and our model
imposes a variety of assumptions. Therefore as a further sensitivity check, we also recalculated the
welfare diﬀerence between the observed and the eﬃcient allocations assuming that demand was
twice as sensitive to price as we have estimated, and half as sensitive. We performed a similar
analysis varying the risk elasticity of demand. These sensitivity analyses increase the range of the
welfare gains to 1-13% of total coverage costs. Given the variety of estimates of risk and price
sensitivity in the literature, one may want to assign a corresponding range of uncertainty to the
potential welfare costs of distorted prices.
6C o n c l u s i o n
Economists have long understood that competition in health insurance markets is no guarantee
of eﬃciency. This paper contributes to a nascent literature that attempts to quantify market
ineﬃciencies and identify their sources. A main ﬁnding is that observed contribution policies
distort enrollment decisions from their eﬃcient level. We calculate that the welfare loss is on the
order of 2-11% of the total cost of coverage. Capturing these gains in full would require the use of
risk-rated contribution policies. In the absence of such policies, employee contributions that more
accurately reﬂected cost diﬀerentials between plans might still increase welfare by 1-3% of coverage
33costs. A key point to emphasize is that despite the observed pricing distortions, there appear to
be substantial gains in our context from introducing plan choice at the employer level.
Our ﬁndings raise the question of how one might fully evaluate the costs and beneﬁts of risk-
rated pricing. Obviously many insurance markets (e.g. the private market for life insurance) have
the feature that prices reﬂect enrollee risk. A diﬃculty with risk rating in health insurance is that
coverage is typically purchased on an annual basis. In such an environment, risk-rated premiums
expose households to reclassiﬁcation risk as their health status changes over time. Indeed the
dynamic insurance provided by uniform pricing within ﬁrms may be a signiﬁcant beneﬁto fa n
employer-based system.
There are also ways to promote static eﬃciency while mitigating reclassiﬁcation risk. Eﬃciency
requires risk-rating only the incremental contributions for higher-cost plans. So one way to insure
against changes in health status is to have a baseline option where the price is independent of risk.
An alternative would be longer-term contracts that provide dynamic insurance (e.g. Cochrane,
1995). It would be interesting to extend our approach into a more dynamic setting and try to
pinpoint the value of dynamic insurance that is provided by uniform contributions and balance this
value against the static distortions.
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36Table 1: Risk and Demographics
Mean Sd. Min. Max.
Employees (N = 3683)
Risk Score 1.21 1.56 0.18 30.06
Age 40.56 12.01 18.00 72.00
Female 0.62 0.48 - -
Spouse 0.28 0.45 - -
Child 0.27 0.44 - -
Enrollees (N = 6603)
Risk Score 1.01 1.45 0.14 30.06
Age 32.13 17.67 0.00 72.00
Female 0.58 0.49 - -
Spouse 0.19 0.39 - -
Child 0.26 0.44 - -
Firm-Years (N = 16)
Risk Score 0.97 0.31 0.63 1.91
Age 31.67 4.63 25.71 46.09
Female 0.53 0.12 0.30 0.70
Spouse 0.19 0.07 0.08 0.27
Child 0.26 0.08 0.06 0.39
Employees 230.19 241.51 28.00 838.00
Dependents 182.50 117.51 9.00 331.00
Notes: In the ﬁrst panel, spouse and child refer to the fraction of employees who enroll with a spouse or at least one child.
In the second and third panels, these entries are the fraction of spouses and children in the set of enrollees. The ﬁrst and
second panels pool observations across ﬁrms and years. The third panel shows statistics of ﬁrm-year level averages, taken
across all enrollees.
1Table 2: Plan Characteristics
Network Integrated
HMO PPO HMO POS All
Offering Plan
Firms 11 10 11 9 -
Firm-Years 16 14 16 13 -
Bid (Monthly)
Employee 307 332 260 276 294
(64) (59) (30) (26) (54)
Employee plus spouse 645 689 544 579 616
(154) (123) (61) (54) (120)
Employee plus child(ren) 591 632 498 532 565
(143) (115) (58) (53) (111)
Employee plus family 918 989 779 832 882
(200) (176) (87) (76) (164)
Contribution (Monthly)
Employee 45 73 38 58 53
(34) (54) (32) (40) (41)
Employee plus spouse 252 303 203 255 253
(120) (103) (77) (75) (100)
Employee plus child(ren) 221 265 177 223 222
(97) (86) (62) (55) (81)
Employee plus family 418 495 342 415 418
(213) (182) (144) (140) (176)
Coinsurance (%)
Employee 87 86 97 78 87
(6) (5) (7) (2) (9)
Deductible (Annual)
Employee 387 440 69 336 304
(264) (306) (163) (94) (262)
Out-of-Pocket Max (Annual)
Employee 2818 2850 1591 2686 2468
(462) (474) (625) (731) (775)
Notes: Mean plan characteristics, with standard deviations in parentheses. Plan characteristics are pooled across years.
Coinsurance, deductible, and out-of-pocket maximum are in-network values and are highly correlated (ρ > .9) with
out-of-network coinsurance, deductible and out-of-pocket maximum. Coverage tiers based on employee plus one
dependent and employee plus two or more dependents are used at two ﬁrms. Bids and costs for these coverage tiers are
not shown.
2Table 3: Risk and Demographics by Plan
Network Integrated
HMO PPO HMO POS All
Employees (N=3683)
Risk Score 1.19 1.22 1.22 1.19 1.21
Age 42.17 40.79 39.73 41.35 40.56
Female 0.62 0.52 0.65 0.56 0.62
Market Share (%) 22.94 7.38 58.72 10.96 100
Enrollees (N=6603)
Risk Score 1.02 1.04 0.99 1.05 1.01
Age 34.19 33.06 30.94 34.12 32.15
Female 0.58 0.54 0.59 0.55 0.58
Market Share (%) 21.24 7.84 60.35 10.57 100
Notes: Employees and enrollees are pooled across ﬁrms and years.
3Table 4: Demand Model
Non-IV IV IV and µ
(1) (2) (3)
Rescaled Coefﬁcients
Contribution -1.00 -1.00 -1.00
(.28) (1.28) (1.43)
Coinsurance (%) 1.91 1.41 2.31
(.49) (2.00) (1.28)
Deductible -0.01 -0.01 0.01
(.02) (.02) (.03)
NHMO
X Risk Score -1.24 -0.92 -1.59
(3.40) (2.04) (1.58)
X Age 1.75 1.27 1.82
(.27) (.24) (.30)
X Female 4.93 4.34 7.20
(9.18) (8.34) (9.86)
X High Risk -21.27 -15.14 -17.17
(12.76) (7.05) (5.59)
NPPO
X Risk Score -11.07 -8.32 -3.93
(6.76) (4.37) (2.64)
X Age 0.75 0.54 0.51
(.45) (.49) (.48)
X Female -34.64 -26.36 -32.44
(14.36) (7.66) (9.54)
X High Risk 49.38 36.89 28.11
(19.87) (11.11) (8.78)
IPOS
X Risk Score -6.10 -4.44 -5.29
(5.41) (2.9) (2.15)
X Age 1.58 1.15 1.56
(.39) (.24) (.35)
X Female -35.24 -25.54 -32.63
(12.85) (10.52) (10.55)
X High Risk 16.40 12.23 9.43
(17.28) (8.81) (7.30)




N 3683 3683 3683
Semi-Elasticities
NHMO -0.09 -0.09 -0.07
NPPO -0.10 -0.05 -0.05
IHMO -0.05 -0.13 -0.10
IPOS -0.09 -0.09 -0.07
Total -0.07 -0.09 -0.07
Notes: Speciﬁcations (2) and (3) use predicted contributions as an instrument. Speciﬁcation (3) allows for privately known
risk. Coefﬁcients are rescaled so that the coefﬁcient on contribution is one. The dependent variable is a dummy variable for
the plan chosen. IHMO is the omitted category. Contribution is in tax adjusted dollars and coinsurance is in percentage
points. Plan ﬁxed effects, income and a dummy variable for nonstandard prescription drug coverage are included but not
shown. Semi-Elasticites are the percent change in market share for a hundred dollar increase in the annual premium,
calculated as (100XMarginalEffect)/(12XMarketShare) in percent.
4Table 5: Costs and Bids
(1) (2)
Network Insurer Markup 1.29 1.27
(.12) (.07)



























Notes: Estimates of cost parameters from joint demand and cost model. See text for details.
5Table 6: Matching and Welfare under Alternative Contribution Policies
Matching Welfare
† Truncated
Gross Insurer Social Social





Market Shares 0.25 0.09 0.54 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Risk Score 1.03 1.07 0.99 1.02
Incremental Contribution
† 9.30 23.70 0.00 5.00
Feasible Risk Rated Contributions
Market Shares 0.37 0.09 0.43 0.11 -16.60 -43.70 27.10 5.00
Risk Score 0.58 0.78 1.49 0.74
Incremental Contribution -14.70 11.80 0.00 -1.30
Optimal Risk Rated Contributions
Market Shares 0.38 0.08 0.44 0.10 -22.10 -57.50 35.50 7.80
Risk Score 0.60 0.79 1.46 0.76
Incremental Contribution -14.90 11.80 0.00 -1.60
Uniform by Tier within Firms
Market Shares 0.31 0.09 0.49 0.12 -6.10 -12.80 6.70 1.40
Risk Score 0.86 1.02 1.11 0.97
Incremental Contribution -16.50 8.90 0.00 -1.10
Enthoven Rule
Market Shares 0.22 0.08 0.58 0.13 -1.10 -0.80 -0.30 -0.50
Risk Score 1.01 1.05 1.00 1.02
Incremental Contribution 28.70 39.90 0.00 10.80
Notes: Feasible Risk Rated Contributions implements efﬁcient matching by setting incremental contributions equal to
incremental costs, conditional on observable risk but not privately known risk. Optimal Risk Rated Contributions sets
incremental contributions equal to incremental costs, conditional on both observable and privately known risk. Uniform
by Tier within Firms maximizes social surplus subject to the constraint that contributions vary only by coverage tier and by
ﬁrm, but not by individual risk. Enthoven Rule is implemented by setting incremental contributions equal to incremental
bids. Risk Score conditional on plan choice. Incremental Contribution with respect to the contribution for IHMO and
unconditional on plan choice. Truncated ﬁxes cost differentials between plans for risk scores outside of 0.75 and 2.0.
Monthly average incremental condition, gross surplus, costs, and social surplus are shown.
† Incremental contribution, gross surplus, insurer costs, and social surplus are averaged across enrollees and
denominated in $ per month.
‡ Gross surplus, insurer costs and social surplus are normalized to zero under the observed allocation. Other scenarios
show gross surplus as social surplus relative to the observed allocation. Under the observed allocation, costs average
$241.70 per enrollee per month. Gross and social surplus are not pinned down.
6Table 7: Matching and Welfare by Risk Score Quintile
Feasible Risk Rated Contributions versus Observed
Matching Welfare Truncated
∆ Gross ∆ Insurer ∆ Social ∆ Social
Quintile (Risk Score range) NHMO NPPO IHMO IPOS Surplus Costs Surplus Surplus
Quintile 1 (<0.36)
∆ Market Share 0.332 0.000 -0.330 -0.002 -27.2 -56.9 29.8 4.3
∆ Incremental Contribution -179.4 -93.4 0.0 -86.6
Quintile 2 (0.36, 0.54)
∆ Market Share 0.265 0.003 -0.266 -0.001 -16.6 -35.6 18.9 3.4
∆ Incremental Contribution -141.6 -75.9 0.0 -65.6
Quintile 3 (0.54, 0.79)
∆ Market Share 0.181 0.006 -0.189 0.002 -7.7 -17.1 9.3 1.3
∆ Incremental Contribution -99.1 -53.4 0.0 -44.6
Quintile 4 (0.79, 1.33)
∆ Market Share 0.040 0.004 -0.037 -0.007 -0.8 -2.4 1.6 0.4
∆ Incremental Contribution -21.0 -19.7 0.0 -1.2
Quintile 5 (>1.33)
∆ Market Share -0.184 -0.047 0.299 -0.069 -30.3 -105.9 75.6 15.4
∆ Incremental Contribution 324.8 154.5 0.0 179.3
Total
∆ Market Share 0.128 -0.007 -0.106 -0.015 -16.6 -43.8 27.1 5.0
∆ Incremental Contribution -23.9 -11.9 0.0 -6.3
Notes: ∆ Market Share, ∆ Incremental Contribution, ∆ Gross Surplus, ∆ Insurer Costs and ∆ Social Surplus are calculated
as the difference between the feasible risk rated and observed values of these variables. Truncated ﬁxes cost differentials
between plans for risk scores outside of 0.75 and 2.0. Values averaged across enrollees within each quintile and
denominated in $ per month. (Total values are averaged across all enrollees.)




‡ Insurer Costs‡ Social Surplus
‡
Observed 0.0 0.0 0.0
All enrolled in:
NHMO -148.8 -9.2 -139.7
NPPO -216.9 5.8 -222.7
IHMO -71.4 -2.1 -69.4
IPOS -180.7 4.5 -185.2
Notes: † Gross surplus, insurer costs, and social surplus are averaged across enrollees and denominated in $ per month.
‡ Gross surplus, insurer costs and social surplus are normalized to zero under the observed allocation. Other scenarios
show gross surplus as social surplus relative to the observed allocation. Under the observed allocation, costs average






Efficiently in B Efficiently in A
High-risks always self-select into plan B.
Choice of Δp can induce any threshold.
Δp= Δc(    ) generates the efficient
allocation of risk types across plans.







Efficiently in A Efficiently in B
High-risk always self-select into plan B.
Choice of Δp can induce any threshold.
No uniform Δp generates the efficient
allocation.
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High (θ,ε) always self-select to PPO.
Choice of Δp can induce any translation
of the pictured indifference curve.

















High (θ,ε) always self-select to PPO.
Choice of Δp can induce any translation
of the pictured indifference curve.
Figure 2B: Efficient allocation assigns high-risk to HMO
θ’ s.t 
Δc(θ’)=Δp






















































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: Incremental Contribution and Incremental Bid are relative to Integrated HMO. In Employee Plus Spouse, numbers
are divided by two for comparability.














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: Each point represents a ﬁrm-year. Beta is the incremental pass-through of bids. See text for details. Employee Beta
versus Risk Score plots the beta for employees against their mean risk score. Employee Plus Spouse Beta versus Risk Score
plots the beta for those in employee plus spouse plans against their risk score. Scatter plots for other coverage tiers look
similar. Mean Beta versus Income plots the mean beta (across coverage tiers) against mean employee income. Mean Beta
versus Firm Size plots the mean beta (across coverage tiers) against the number of employees in the ﬁrm. Separate scatter
plots by coverage tier look similar.
























































































































































































Notes: Each point represents a insurer-employee-year. Risk Score is the average enrollee risk score in a ﬁrm-year. Costs is
the insurers monthly cost per enrollee. Fitted lines for the Network HMO and Integrated HMO.












































































































































































































































Notes: Each point represents a plan-employee-year. E[Risk|Age, Male] is the average predicted risk score of potential
enrollees in a ﬁrm-year. Bids is the per-month bid. Fitted lines for the Network HMO and Integrated HMO.
14Table A1: Alternative Demand Model Speciﬁcations
Family Structure Alternative Instruments
Baseline Employees Family Interactions Constrained Predicted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Rescaled Coefﬁcients
Contribution -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00
(.28) (.36) (.26) (.95) (1.11)
Coinsurance (%) 1.91 0.95 1.73 2.48 1.82
(.49) (.47) (.44) (1.81) (.74)
Deductible -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.00
(.02) (.02) (.01) (.04) (.04)
NHMO
X Risk Score -1.24 -1.40 -1.63 -1.64 -0.83
(3.4) (3.05) (3.08) (3.42) (4.72)
X Age 1.75 1.35 1.49 2.31 1.34
(.27) (.27) (.29) (.3) (.16)
X Male 4.93 5.67 1.54 5.64 15.13
(9.18) (7.49) (8.2) (11.48) (18.47)
X High Risk -21.27 -15.06 -14.80 -28.53 -13.92






X Risk Score -11.07 -1.04 -8.43 -14.27 -10.61
(6.76) (4.84) (5.86) (7.45) (7.27)
X Age 0.75 -0.02 0.62 1.00 0.41
(.45) (.46) (.47) (.65) (.37)
X Male -34.64 -15.70 -27.14 -44.26 -31.96
(14.36) (12.14) (13.43) (14.8) (11.78)
X High Risk 49.38 7.45 36.23 64.09 46.29






X Risk Score -6.10 -4.83 -6.25 -8.03 -4.70
(5.41) (5.05) (4.94) (5.09) (2.8)
X Age 1.58 0.91 1.20 2.09 1.19
(.39) (.4) (.41) (.38) (.26)
X Male -35.24 -25.67 -33.33 -46.64 -23.94
(12.85) (10.13) (11.34) (14.08) (7.65)
X High Risk 16.40 24.60 20.97 21.28 15.68





σe 109.29 81.66 97.46 145.13 119.91
- - - - -
N 3683 2252 3683 3683 3683
Semi-Elasticities
NHMO -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 -0.05 -0.06
NPPO -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.05 -0.05
IHMO -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.08 -0.09
IPOS -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.07 -0.06
Total -0.07 -0.07 -0.70 -0.04 -0.07
Baseline (1) repeats the non-IV speciﬁcation of Table 4. Family structure is examined in speciﬁcations (2) and (3). In
Employees (2), the baseline model is estimated on the subsample of employees who enrollee as individuals. In Family
Interactions (3), spouse and child by plan interactions are added to the baseline speciﬁcation. Alternative instruments are
examined in speciﬁcations (4) and (5) . In (5), we instrument using predicted plan contributions but constrain the
parameters in the contribution model to be constant across ﬁrms. In (5), the predicted contribution equation is estimated
using predicted bids. See Section 4.2 for details. Standardized coefﬁcients are normalized by the coefﬁcient on monthly
contributions. The dependent variable is a dummy variable for the plan chosen. IHMO is the omitted category.
Contribution is in tax adjusted dollars and coinsurance is in percentage points. Plan ﬁxed effects, income and a dummy
variable for nonstandard prescription drug coverage are included but not shown. Semi-Elasticites are the percent change
in market share for a hundred dollar increase in the annual premium, calculated as
(100XMarginalEffect)/(12XMarketShare) in percent.
15